Land reform and its financial arrangements are central elements of modern Irish history. Yet to date, the financial mechanisms underpinning Irish land reform have been overlooked. The paper outlines the mechanisms of land reform in Ireland and the importance of land bonds to the process. Advances worth over £127 million were made to tenant farmers to purchase their holdings. These schemes enabled the transfer of over three quarters of land on the island of
Introduction
Land reform -the reallocation of property rights and the redistribution of land -is a process that almost all countries have undertaken, in some form or other, during their development.
1 Indeed, land reform continues to be a central component in the World Bank's prescribed policies for developing countries. 2 Moreover, recent empirical and theoretical studies suggest that reductions in land inequality (i.e. land reform) lead to higher income growth, reductions in poverty and growth in human capital. 3 However, regardless of the desired outcome, there is no broad consensus on the design for land reform policies. In this paper, we contribute to the debate on the design of land reform by studying the policies adopted towards Ireland at the end of the nineteenth century. 7 We provide a comprehensive background to explain how state funded land purchase came to be seen as a 'final settlement' to the long-running 'land war' and rural unrest in Ireland. 8 In particular, we describe the policy features that made the implementation of Irish land reform successful in terms of achieving its goal of peasant-proprietorship. 9 In a series of policies adopted from 1891 to 1934, the governments of the day achieved the transfer of almost all land ownership from landlords to tenants. Moreover, the series of land reform policies were adopted and implemented with little social or political disruption, although it should be noted that this was a period of significant social and political upheaval.
Land reform was successful in Ireland primarily because the state created a source of credit to purchase land at 'market' prices, a feature of land reform that is difficult to replicate in other regions without adequate financial support mechanisms. Central to the success of Ireland's land reform was the use of specifically designed government-guaranteed financial instruments -land bonds. Through these bonds, successive acts of parliaments (UK, Irish Free State and Northern Ireland) enabled tenantfarmers to purchase land from landlords. 10 Although Ireland was one of the first countries to see government bonds used to implement land reform, bonds were subsequently used in various countries. 1890 -1905 (Cork, 1987 . 9 In this paper, we do not address the long-term effects, or the welfare implications, of land reform in Ireland. However, not all countries had equivalent degrees of success. 12 Why, then, was their use in Ireland so successful?
To further our understanding of land bonds, we introduce a database of Irish land bond prices recorded daily on the Dublin Stock Exchange from 1892, when land bonds were first issued, to 1938, when the Anglo-Irish trade agreement was signed. Our database, presented in Appendix B, is the first systematic effort to collect land bond prices. It fills important lacunas in the understanding of the mechanics of Irish land reform and in the knowledge of long-run Irish interest rates. 13 More generally, it contributes to the wider literature on returns to government bonds in the early twentieth century. 14 We outline the origin of land bonds, their legal structure, where they were traded and who owned them. We argue that a key element to the Irish story is the presence of state banking, whereby the state actively provides financial assistance to a sector adversely affected by globalization. 15 We
show that the largest holders of Irish land bonds were institutional state-owned investors, in particular the Post Office Savings Bank that, by 1913, held 44 percent of land bonds issues. Furthermore, land bonds were a growing share of POSB assets, increasing from almost nothing to 20 percent of assets between 1898 and 1913.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the development of land purchase schemes in Ireland, section 3 outlines data on land bonds derived from records of the Dublin Stock Exchange, and the concept of state banking is discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 12 For example, Russell King, Land reform: a world survey (London, 1977) . 13 The lack of completeness in the history of Irish interest rates is evident in Sidney Homer & Richard Sylla, to the agricultural sector of the Irish economy. To finance these loans, the government guaranteed land bonds that were tradeable in several markets.
The integration of international factor markets in the late nineteenth century are important contextual elements for understanding these policy innovations. 17 Falling agricultural prices coupled with rising real wages eroded landlord economic and political power. Ireland, as part of the UK, adhered to free trade principles throughout this period and this, together with changing market conditions, made sale of land increasingly attractive to landlords.
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In this section, we provide details on the land purchase schemes, including their size, operation and the various obligations imposed on tenant-purchasers. We also set out the contemporaneous private options for land purchase available to prospective Irish tenant-farmers as important context to our explanation of the demand for state-sponsored land purchase schemes.
Land purchase schemes: size and operation
A number of acts were passed between 1869 and 1934 which enabled tenants to purchase their holdings in Ireland. 19 In total, as shown in responsible for collection (Land Commission). 24 These annuities were collected into a sinking fund that was used to pay dividends twice yearly and retire some of the outstanding bonds at the discretion of the government. 25 In the event of a default, a guarantee mechanism was activated whereby annuity payments were made by the guarantee fund, essentially local taxation, and this was intended to cover both interest and annuity cost. Table 2 summarizes the specific tenant obligations associated with each land act. Over the period 1870 to 1909, the state gradually increased the portion of the mortgage it was willing to lend from 66 to 100 percent. Initially, under the 1869 to 1881 acts, the state did not finance the entire purchase price, and it was the tenant's responsibility to raise the residual capital. However, the evidence suggests that only the wealthier tenants were able to take advantage of this facility. From 1885 onwards, government support of land purchase was more prominent, reflected by the increase in the percentage of the mortgage which the state advanced to tenants. Government bodies from 1885 onwards were issuing loans worth 100 percent of the purchase price of a given holding. This is significant as it no longer excluded tenants who had insufficient capital, and the state became the primary mortgagee on the land.
Land purchase schemes: Government supply
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The higher coverage of the purchase price by the state was coupled with longer loan terms.
Initial mortgage loan terms were roughly half those under later land acts. The land acts from 1903 onwards did not specify a definite term for a loan but instead stated that 'the purchase annuity shall be paid until the whole of the advance, in respect of which it is payable, is ascertained in manner prescribed percent, competitive with the best available market rates. Some evidence on private mortgages in the early twentieth century suggests that rates charged for mortgages were between 4 and 10 percent.
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Moreover, the differential between the rates paid and prevailing long-term interest rates decreased under the various acts. As long-term interest rates increased during the war, the relatively low interest rates paid by those purchasing under the 1903 and 1909 acts became even more attractive because their fixed rates were well-below market rates.
The loan contracts made no allowance for future price movements. However, as the land purchase contracts were designed, inflation was a boon to farmers whereas prolonged deflation was not.
Moreover, the long loan terms created the possibility of embedded risk, as annuities were set without regard to future price trends, which could be risky to the scheme if it adversely affected farmers.
Importantly, from the perspective of the governments presiding over the 1903/1909 acts, these policies had an immediate benefit even if they may have led to future political difficulties. 36 Despite the halving of annuities, arrears continued to be relatively higher in the 1930s than they had been previously, perhaps a reflection of the Anglo-Irish 'economic war' whereby the British government imposed tariffs on Irish produce, primarily livestock, in retaliation for the default on the annuity repayments.
The economic effect of cutting annuity payments was to transfer the loan repayment from Irish landowners to the UK taxpayer. The evidence above suggests that the ex-post burden on Irish landowners from repaying the loans derived from the price at which the land was transacted. But this does not mean that the land was over-priced relative to the expected present discounted value of the returns at the time the land was purchased. It is possible that misperceptions of future returns contributed to an ex-post over-pricing of land during the reform. But, without better data on rental rates and the expectations of purchasers about the returns to agricultural productivity, it is not clear whether the land was over-priced contemporaneously. assets, and the cost of determining property rights. 42 Illiquidity of loans backed by land was common at the time, since there was no ability to securitize such loans. This was a challenge to risk management, given the banks' liability structure and the absence of a central bank with lender of last resort powers.
Land purchase schemes: private alternatives and tenant demand
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There was also the problem of sale of land in the event of default, and in Ireland this was a significant deterrent to the entry of the JSBs in the mortgage market. This became obvious in the 1926 banking commission as evidence was shown that the sale of foreclosed land was difficult due to social pressure on buyers. 44 Therefore, mortgage assets were practically worthless if a borrower defaulted on loan repayments.
State entry into the mortgage market was a novel approach to solving the lack of credit available to would-be tenant-purchasers. Also, the fact that the state offered 100 per cent loan to value made the schemes accessible to all borrowers regardless of credit status. 45 State mortgage loans seem to have been based on a policy of social entitlement, disregarding the commercial considerations that caused private lenders to hesitate. Figure 2 illustrates the effectiveness of government intervention in the land market. In 1906 only a small share of farmers were owners of their land, but by 1917 a far larger share of Irish farmers were owner-occupiers. In the absence of private alternatives to the attractive terms and accessibility offered by the land purchase schemes, it is unsurprising that there was keen interest from prospective tenant-purchasers. Indeed, it appears that the appetite for the generous terms on offer under Loans could be renegotiated in order to minimise losses, but private lenders would not be as willing as the state to completely absolve debt obligations, especially on a grand scale.
Land Bonds
Bonds issued under the Irish land acts were used specifically to finance land purchase in Ireland. They were distinct from other types of UK government debt, allowing scholars an insight into UK Treasury rationale regarding Ireland, the decision of landlords to sell, and also offer a perspective on the motives of traders and holders of these bonds.
The Irish land bonds distinct from Consols. For example, when the 'Guaranteed £2:15s % stock' was issued, the prospectus (3 January 1905) highlighted that the stock was 'to be created under The following sections discuss the technicalities of these bonds and introduce a new database of land bond prices derived from the Dublin Stock Exchange. these bonds in the market or retain the bonds and receive the bi-annual dividend on the stock; 62 whereas, later acts paid in cash and/or bonds.
Land Bonds: Financing land purchase schemes
The use of British credit to finance land reform in Ireland was not without reservations. The UK Treasury was reluctant to sanction the bond issues under the Irish land acts as they were extremely risky and because these terms, as set out in 62 The 1903 act allowed for payment in cash, raised through the sale of stock, because the market price for the bonds was typically below par after 1900. In addition, the act introduced a land purchase aid fund of £12 million to be distributed to landlords ostensibly to cover legal costs involved in sales, but widely perceived as an inducement to encourage landlords to sell. the finances which the Runciman report estimated would be around £20 million over the 68.5 years of the 1903 act, on the assumption that the market prices were constant. 70 However, deficiencies in stock issues were to be met from the Irish development grant, probate duty grants and agricultural grants administered under the 1898 local government act. 71 The fact that the programme was financially unsustainable effectively meant that the purchasers of land under the government land purchase schemes actually received their farms under concessional terms of state-subsidy.
However, the lack of inherent sustainability in the programme should not have been a major concern for investors, since the nominal value of the land bonds was a small fraction of the British economy. Based on records from our dataset (discussed in the next section), figure 3 shows that the 
Land Bonds: Dublin Stock Exchange
The source for our data are the daily records of the Dublin Stock Exchange. 73 We collected data from 1890 through to 1938, covering the first issuance of bonds under the 1891 land act through to the AngloIrish trade agreement. In particular, we obtained records of daily closing prices and amounts outstanding for all government-guaranteed debt traded on the Dublin Stock Exchange. 74 The exchange was open
Monday-Friday (and Saturday in some years) excluding public holidays such as Easter and Christmas.
The stock exchange was closed from August to December 1914, due to the War, and also briefly due to a financial crisis in 1931.
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Although London was the pre-eminent financial trading centre of the time, we use Dublin Stock
Exchange data because not all land bonds were traded in London. 76 That said, stock markets in London and Dublin were closely integrated during our period of study. The installation of a direct telegraph connection between Dublin and London in 1850 ensured information lagged at most one day, and the telephone was introduced in 1897. 77 Therefore, closing prices in Dublin should be reasonably close to those in London throughout our data. 6 ) it cannot be used to infer anything about the liquidity of an issue at a point in time. According to this proxy, land bond liquidity on the Dublin Stock exchange compared favourably with the majority of exchequer bonds. In particular, the liquidity of the final British-guaranteed land bond appears on a par with that of the consolidated stock, consistent with the assessment of Thomas that the sterling guarantee combined with quotation on the London Stock Exchange made this bond "always a big attraction" in the inter-war period. 82 As consols are the longest living and have the largest amount outstanding in our data, it is not surprising that they are found to be highly liquid in our dataset.
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By contrast, the 2½ percent and 2¾ percent stocks are quite illiquid, even relative to the land bonds. Although the broad movements in the price series are similar, some of the more detailed activity in land bond prices is different from that of UK consols and exchequer bonds. First, there is more volatility in the land bond prices than in consols and exchequer bonds around the time of Irish partition and civil war (1921) (1922) (1923) . Second, the movement in land bond prices appears more muted, in particular the large issues of 1903/09 land bonds and the 4.5 percent land bonds. And, thirdly, while land bonds were at times viewed as unpopular, their prices towards the end of our data suggest that they had become more attractive even than consols, despite the risk that the bonds might have been called for redemption. 85 To study this issue carefully, we need to account for individual bond characteristics, such as offered rate and duration, as well as market liquidity and volatility.
Land Bonds: sovereign bond prices & returns
Summary statistics of bond returns, presented in Table 6 , over the entire period and different sub-samples help to clarify these observations. 86 For each bond, in addition to the number of observations and the average returns in each sub-sample, we report the standard deviation of returns as a measure of volatility during each period and our liquidity measure (the fraction of days on which trading took place). Average returns are consistently near-zero across bonds and subsamples, as is common in studies of daily returns.
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During the early sub-samples, consols are by far the most liquid bond and the exchequer bonds are traded only modestly. Land bonds were traded more frequently than exchequer bonds and remained relatively liquid during World War I. Moreover, while the liquidity of consols declined significantly after 1920, some land bonds were traded more frequently towards the end of the period. The analysis by sub-period confirms the overall finding that the 4.5 percent land bonds were particularly popular during the interwar period. However, there was a decline in liquidity for the other three British government-guaranteed land bonds. This may in part reflect a migration of trading into markets that listed a full set of British securities and were more connected to London traders.
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Although land bond returns and UK consols and exchequer bond returns display similar volatility over the entire sample, there is considerable variation across sub-samples from World War I onwards. To explore this variation further, figure 7 shows the standard deviation of the weighted average of these returns computed using a rolling window of three years (750 days) around each date on the horizontal axis. with an additional 3-4 per cent held in Northern Ireland.
Offer argues that the British government found it difficult to float land bonds and that savings banks and later national insurance funds were the main purchasers of land bonds. UK savings banks, unlike savings banks in Europe or the US, did not lend for commercial purposes but instead acted like money market mutual funds and invested in government securities. The responsibility for the investments was in the hands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the National Debt Commissioners.
Offer states that in the Edwardian period government borrowing was 'kept in reserve for a naval or political emergency' with the notable exception of Irish land reform. 96 There is strong evidence to suggest that these bonds were purchased by other state financial institutions, namely the Post Office Savings Bank and Trustee Savings Bank, as outlined in Figure 9 . 97 Later records show that the POSB Thus, from the discussion above, it is clear that Ireland was indeed a recipient of state banking but was this due to the 'class politics' motivation that Verdier suggested?
State land purchase policies were directed responses to social agitation in the 1870s and 80s that were pursued along class lines. Bad harvests in the late 1870s that coincided with the 'grain invasion', an increase in grain exports from granaries in the new world, and rising competition in traditional Irish export markets, 101 effectively meant that Irish agricultural producers experienced a sustained reduction in farming income. Although it did not address the root causes of these problems, an umbrella coalition of interest groups called the Land League campaigned for rent reductions and promoted social agitation against landlords. 102 The Land League was attractive to those who viewed the payment of rent as the immediate cause of their problems as it promised a reduction in rents and aimed to achieve owner-occupancy of farms.
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Government reaction to Land League agitation was primarily to introduce new land law legislation. 104 The 1881 Land Act was essentially a rent control act, with judicially-determined lower rents and a Land Commission established by the act to mediate in landlord-tenant contractual disputes.
The aim of the act was to grant the tenants a 'fair rent', but the policy seems to have been to reduce rents regardless of their level.
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One of the most significant aspects of the 1881 act was that it brought land purchase schemes to greater prominence than it had been previously. The legislation made facilities available for tenants to buy land from landlords. However, land purchase schemes failed to attract much support in their initial phases, probably due to a view that judicial rent reductions may have been less costly to implement than expanded land purchase schemes. Future land purchases saw tenants purchase their holdings with the purchase price set in terms of judicially reduced rents.
As illustrated in Table 2 , subsequent legislation was specifically designed to encourage greater transfer of ownership from landlords to their tenants. Most notably, the institution created under the 1881 land act to mediate rent disputes, the Land Commission, was transformed into an institution that supervised the sale of land. the owners of land by demanding rent reductions; and (v) if land owners, sell land to tenants at high prices despite the falling profitability of agriculture.
Tenant-farmers in Ireland initially choose to pursue (iv) but, as has been shown heretofore, (v) became the option of choice at the behest of the government.At no point were options (i) to (iii) pursued.
Concluding remarks
This article analyses a land reform programme that successful reached its policy goal of land ownership transfers. Irish land reform witnessed the widespread transfer of land ownership from landlords to sitting tenants and the land transfer programme was enabled by large scale financial investment underwritten by the British government. Without the creation of a source of credit that enabled most sitting tenants to purchase land at 'market' prices from incumbent landlords the scheme would not have been as successful.
A key finding of this paper is the importance of state banking in implementing land reform in
Ireland. Without the issue of land bonds and the simultaneous purchase of these securities by the UK savings bank funds, land reform would have ground to a halt. This is an interesting facet of land reform policy in Ireland that could be extended to other countries wishing to undertake land reform. A key stumbling block in this regard is noted by Riedinger in the case of the Philippines in the 1990s, namely that the World Bank's Articles of Association do not enable it 'to finance compensation payments for the transfer of existing assets' and a general unwillingness by foreign donors to fund land purchases.
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In the case of the Philippines, international donors were reluctant to finance the programme because of concerns over the implementation of land reform programme and the credibility of government support for the programme. 108 This contrasts strongly with the Irish case, primarily because the 'international donor' did in fact design and implement the reform programme. Appendix A: The 1870 Land Act
Precedents for state-funded land purchase were established by significant acts passed in 1869 and 1870.
The Irish Church Act of 1869, primarily an act which disestablished the Church of Ireland as a statesponsored church in Ireland, contained clauses enabling tenants on church lands to purchase their holdings with the aid of state-financed mortgages. 122 The 1870 land act also included land purchase clauses, whereby the state would advance money for the purchase of a tenant's holding. 123 However, neither of these acts had a high uptake in terms of land purchase, and of the two the 1869 act saw the greater number of tenant purchases. 124 The primary aim of the 1870 act was to reform the existing law governing landlord tenant These extra-legal rights varied from estate to estate, but often carried the presumption that a sitting tenant could expect renewal of a lease, once it had expired; that rents would be 'fair', meaning essentially lower than the competitive or rack-rent; and that on vacating a holding he or she had the right to sell the value of the unexpired lease to the incoming tenant. The last could be valuable, amounting on some farms to ten times or more the annual rent paid to the landlord, suggesting that actual rents were well below the competitive rent level. 125 There was a common impression that the perceived prosperity of Ulster farming, small tillage farming, was based on the 'Ulster custom'. Vaughan has suggested that perhaps contemporaries were not able to distinguish between a flax boom, caused by market dislocations resulting from the American Civil War (the so-called 'Cotton Famine'), and the customs prevailing in Ulster. 126 Support for
Vaughan's argument comes from the general report of the 1871 census where it was stated that 'in that province [Ulster], however, throughout almost its entire extent, the cultivation of flax is connected with
The 1870 Land Act attempted to formalise informal traditional customs in Ulster. One of the main assumptions of the acts was that the tenancy system in Ireland was an impediment to agricultural investment as tenants were unwilling to invest in agricultural improvements because of a fear that such investment would lead to either rent increases or arbitrary eviction. Solow and Vaughan have argued that this scenario did not exist, and that tenancies were relatively secure before the 1880s. 128 The evidence on evictions also suggests that there was a low probability of eviction in post-famine Ireland.
Thus, suggesting that the 1870 land act was misguided at best. 128 
Solow, The Land Question and the Irish Economy and Vaughan, Landlords and tenants in mid-Victorian Ireland
Appendix B: Annual land bond prices 
